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IN THE SUP'REME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

PIIYLLIS K. S'Tl. . BER,
Plaintiff and R-espondent)

vs.

IIAl~\rEY

/

Case No. · · ·
7764

T. S-TUBER,
Defendant and Appellant.

I
APPELLANr_r'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On Ivlarch 29, 1945, the .respondent was granted .a
Decree of Divorce from the appellant in the District
Court of Salt Lake County. The resp·ondent was awarded
the custody of Bruce Stuber, the minor child of plaintiff
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and defendant, who at that time was 14 months of age.
Respondent was granted $30.00 per month for the support of said child, together with alimony in th~ sum of
$50.00 per month (T-1).
On February 13, 1951, respondent filed her Affidavit
setting up the terms of the Decree of Divorce, and alleging that respondent, due to her inability to properly
care for said child, voluntarily placed the custody of
said child with the appellant until such time as she
could properly care for said child, and setting forth a
claim for unpaid alimony in the amount of $3,550.00 (T-3).
To the Affidavit thus filed, appellant made answer
In substance and effect as follows: He admitted the
award of $30.00 per month for the support of the minor
child and. the sum of $50.00 per month alimony a.s set
forth in the Decree. He admitted he had not paid the
alimony and set forth that said minor child had been in
his care, custody, and control, and that he had given to
·said child its sole sup·port ever since the month of February, 1946; denied that the child had been in the care,
custody, and control of appellant's mother except a short
time following the granting of. the Decree of Divorce;
that he remarried on October 15, 1947, and that since
that time said child had been in the care, custody, and
control of ap·pellant and· ihis wife. For a period of
approximately two years following February,. 1946, the
respondent did not see said child and made no inquiries
concerning said child, and that th.e mother took no substantial interest in said child until January 1950 and

'

'
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then visited said child on an average of once a n1onth.
He alleged a.ffirn1atively that the respondent was not a
proper person to have the care, custody, and control of
said child; that said child had been cared for by ap·pellant and his present "ife with the assistance of his
mother, all of 'vho1n "\vere greatly interested in its welfare, and that the conduct and behavior of the plaintiff
''"·as not of such character as was or would be beneficial
to said child if the care, custody, and control of said
child was a\varded to the respondent.
In Paragraph 4, appellant alleged that in the month
of February, 1946, he had a conversation with respondent
regarding said child, ~d at said time, respondent stated
to appellant that she \Vanted appellant to take over the
custody of said child and ussun1e the· obligation of its
support, care, and Inaintena.nce; that if he would do so,
respondent would n1ake no clain1 against appellant for
any alimony or support n1Qney fo;r herself; the parties ,
then agreed that appellant would take over the care,
custody, and control of said child and pay for same if the
respondent \vould release to him any rights that she
n1ight have to said child, and if she \vould further release
any clain1 against appellant for alimony in the future.
Appellant and respondent then and there agreed that for
the foregoing considerations respondent would release
nny elai1n that she 1night have against appellant for the
future custody of said ehild and would n1ake no clai1n for ,
any alilnony in the future to \Vhich she might otherwi.se
be entitled. Following said agreement, the appellant
did take over the custody of said child in the n1onth of
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February, 1946; that ever since said time said child
has been in his care, custody, and control; and that he
had supported and cared for said child at his own sole
cost and expense, and alleged that the respondent had
never at any time since said agreement made any request
or demand of any kind for alimony under the terms of
said Decree, and that by reason of all of the facts and
circumstances, respondent was estopped from asserting
any right under the terms of said Decree of Divorce to
recover a judgment against the appellant for any alimony
accrued under the terms of the Decree.
In Paragraph 6 of his Answer, appellant also sets
forth that because of the circumstances aforesaid, the
respondent had been guilty of laches in asserting any
right or demand for alimony in a court of equity, and
that by reason of said laches and because of the agreement between the parties, her claim to relief was barred.
By Paragraph 7 the appellant further alleged that the
respondent was regularly employed and was able to support and maintain herself and liad been able to support
and maintain herself ever since 1946 and had in fact
supported herself without assistance from the appeHant
and requested

~-

modification of the Decree so as to

relieve appellant of payment of alimony under the tern1s
of the Decree. That said Decree: be further modified so
as to give to the appellant the exclusive. ~are, custody,
and control of the minor child subject to reasonable
visitation by the respondent (T-9-13).
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The respondent filed a reply \Vherein she ad1nitted
that she did v·oluntarily surrender the care of said child
to the appellant and claiming that she. did so because
she was not so situated as to support or care for said
child, but desired to have said child returned to her when
she "\vas able to provide for and care for said child. She
further admits that the appellant had cared·for and supported said child since February, 1946; that she agreed
with the appellant that said child should be supported
and cared for by the appellant until she could properly
find a place to care for said child, "and that the defendant agreed with plaintiff that she could take said child
as a dependent for the purpose of her income tax and
he has violated this agreen1ent." ( T -14-15).
The evidence in support of the above issues shows
in substance that when the appellant took over the cu~
tody of the child, Bruce Stuber, he was then 14 months
of age. At the ti1ne of the hearing of this cause on May
14:, 1951, he was 7 years of age ( T -20).
At the ti1ne the appellant took the child, Mrs. Stuber
was living with a girl friend and felt that she vv-as unable
to take proper care of the child; that she did not have
enough money to take care of him herself; but testified
that it was her understanding that she could get him back
('r-21); that ~fr. Stuber told her he would not pay her
any 1noney for the child nor for herself. She also testified
that they talked about who would claim Bruce as a
dependent; that she said she would; and that Mr. Stuber
ag-reed to this (T.-:22). l\!rs. Stuber ·was not in a position
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to support the child until the present time; that she
had now made arrangements with her mother who had
agreed to take care of Bruce until she could remarry.
That while Bruce was with his father, she visited hi1n
as often as she felt like it, as often as she wanted to nearly; that when she went to get Bruce, that she was not
invited into the home, and had had the door slammed in
her face (T-23). That respondent and Bruce get along
very well, and that he seems to enjoy being with her.
Mr. Stuber and his wife have never refused to let her
see Bruce; that she had not had any trouble about seeing
him, but they were nasty a few times about it. Since
the appellant took Bruce into his custody and control,
he had not paid any money under the Decree of Divorce
for alimony; that she had been taking the child as a
dependent, even though he was being supported by his
father (T-24). She had claimed Bruce as a dependent
ever since she had been working, and that she had been
working most of the time since her divorce. The government had asked for payment from her for three years
back and told her she could not claim him as a dependent
because Mr. Stuber was supporting him. She had asked
Mr. Stuber for the return of Bruce and he had refused
( T -25). She further testified after the divorce was granted, she and Mr. Stuber lived together for a short time,
but did not get along well, so they separated; that the
agreement with Mr. Stuber about Bruce and his support
was had about two months after the separation. At that
time, she knew that Bruce would be taken care of by
Mr. Stuber's mothe:r and supported by Mr. Stuber. Mrs.
Stuber took good care of him.
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Q. N o,Y, as I understand your testimony, Mrs.
Stuber, ""rhen you agreed that Mr. Stuber
would take the child, you agreed that he
should take tl1e child, and that you would
release him fron1 any support money for the
child and release him from the payment of
alimonyo?
..;..\..

I told hiin that if Bruce were well taken care
of there wouldn't be any trouble (T-27).

Concerning· the care of Bruce after ~fr. Stuber remarried, the respondent testified that he was well taken
care of, but she still didn't think they gave him the love
and affection he needs ; that on some occasions when she
called for hin1, he was not as clean as she would have
liked to see him, and that he seems to be somewhat thin
and nervous. That when she would get him, he didn't
know just who to 1nind. That he is quite emotional and
runs around constantly, and that he doesn't like school.
"He doesn't have any interest in anything, as far as I
can understand, just what he has told me." (T-28).
That respondent did not see Bruce for the first two
years after Mr. Stuber took hirn (T-29); she felt like if
Bruce \Vas going to stay with his father, that she couldn't
see any .outlet· as to how she would be able to take care
of him. She felt like it was for his own good that he have
very fe\v people to interfere, and that it would be better
if he \vas living there like he was ; that she had seen._
him about twice a n1onth following said two year period.
\Vhen she goes to see him, she picks him up in a car and
takes hirn 'vi th her ( T -30).
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Q. What is it you object to because we want to
make it pleasant for you when you go to see
the child~
A.

Well, I don't see why I have to stand outside;
not that I really care to go in, that isn't the
point, but at least people can treat you civil
when you go to get your own child.

Q. Well, you mean they didn't invite you in the
house,~

A.

No, they never have since I and Harvey have
been divorced.

On one occasion, she called to get Bruce and Mr.
Stuber raised a .commotion. Bruce cried to go with me.
Mr. Stuber wouldn't let him go at first, but then he
called me up and said that Bruce could go. That was
about a month ago (T-31).

Q.

Is that the only time anything of that kind
has occurred, like that~

A.

He has been fairly decent to me. I never
made any claim for any money. I never made
any claim for any money against Mr. Stuber
until the Collector of Internal Revenue made
a claim against me. I never bothered him.
That was .about December 27, 1950. At that
time I wa.s very upset about Bruce.

When we talked about Mr. Stuber taking Bruce, I
didn't say he should be released. We talked about nry
taking Bruce as a dependent. I was employed· at the
time at the Le-rner Shops (T-33). I didn't talk to Mr.
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Stuber about taking Bruce as a dependent until I had
notice from the Office of the Collector of Internal Revenue. While Bruce "~as 'vith ~lr. Stuber's Inothe.r, he
told me he 'vas paying her $65.00 per month. I expect
to get married. I am acquainted 'vith Mr. Fred E. Bacon
(T-31). He is a mru:ried man living in Salt Lake and
I have been going out with him for quite a while. He
has divorce proceedings pending. I don't know if it is
in court or not, but it is in the proceedings to be in court.
l\Ir. Bacon, 'Nhom I- contemplate marrying, has been
separated from his wife almost two years.

Q. I 'vill ask you if it is not a fact, Mrs. Stuber,
that for a period of appro~imately a year,
you \vere living at No. 234 North Main Street
in Salt Lake City, and 'vas registered there
during all of that period as ~1r. and 1\Irs.
F'red Bacon ~
~\.

That's right ( T -84).

I never did request Mr. Stuber to make any payment
of ali1nony to me or support money until this question
arose with the Collector of Internal Revenue (T-35). Mr.
Stuber, his 'vife, and mother are 'vorkirig, and during
the past year Bruce has so1netimes been taken care of
hy a baby tender.
I talked to Bruce's school teacher and he \Vasn't in
school for almost a n1onth and he was absent an awful
lot. They took hin1 deer hunting. The teacher said he
was not very intelligent, but no one took sufficient inte-rest
in him to help him with his reading (T-38). The teacher
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said that he was sometimes truant from school and Bruce
says he does not like school. During the period, I didn't
see him for two years, it seemed like he has too many
bosses, and I thought it was for his own good that I
didn't interfere. My mother lives at 1538 West 8th South
Stre·et, and has a good home and is able to take care of
Bruce (T-39). I do not live with my mother. I haven't
lived with he-r since I was married to Mr. Stuber. If
I obtain the custody of Bruce·, I would have him live
with my mother and she would care for him. I don't
expect to live with my mother unless some arrangement
can be made whe-re I can, but it is not a very big home.
We will ha:ve to work that out when the time comes. She
has two bedrooms and a living roon1, five rooms all
together. There are my mother and father, a sister, and
a brother, all living in mother's home (T-40).
I work at the Blue Cross Insurance Con1pany and
earn $130.00 per month afte-r deductions. I have been
working at different jobs for four or five years (T-41). ·
Mrs. Ethel Kalian, the 1nothe-r of respondent, testified that she would be able to take care of Bruce teinporarily; that Bruce: had been at her hon1e on different
occasions, and she and Bruce get along well together
(T-43). I get along well with my daughter. I a1n 48
years of age and was quite ill a few years ago, but feel
better now. I have neve·r had any trouble when I went
to get Bruce, and appellant and his wife have always
been friendly to me. They would let us keep him a couple
of days if we wanted to (T-45). I know the appellant's
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Inother is al\vays yery n1uch interested in Bruce and gives
hun a great deal of love and affection. We never had
any trouble about it. The appellant's wife has always
treated n1e "cith proper consideration (T-46). We had
some little difficulty only on one occasion (T-47).
The appellant testified in substance that he is employed by the l~nion Pacific Railroad where he has steady
work as a brakeman and earns a good salary of about
$400.00 a month before deductions (T-49) .
.Appellant testified that when he took the custody of
Bruce, that the respondent was living with a girl friend;
that she was having trouble with heT mother and did
not want her 1nother to have the custody of Bruce (T-51).
I \vas up to see the baby one day and it was ill and it
\vas agreed that I should take the. baby, and that if I did
take it, that I would not pay her any more support money
or alin1ony. It was agreed at that thne that my mother
\Vould take care of Bruce because I had to work each day
and w·as living at hon1e with my mother. I took the cus-tody of the baby at that time. He was then two years
old and he is now 7 years old and I have had him during
this "Thole five year period (T-52). I paid my mother
$60.00 a month for his care and paid all of the bills, such
as phone, lights, gas, and groceries. We have a six roon1
house (T-53).
/

vV e have never had any trouble with Bruce or with
one another. ~fy present wife and 1nother are very much
interested in his welfare. They are both very kind and
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affectionate toward him (T-55). My wife and I agree
very well in connection with his discipline. My mother
is 54 years old; I am 33 years old; and my present wife
·is 27 years old. We have one child besides Bruce., who
was two years old in February, 1951. The children get
along well together and think a great deal of one another.
Most of his marks in school are satisfactory ( T -56). His
last report card showed eight satisfactory marks and
three unsatisfactory. These related to loud talk in school
and one was in reading. I am sure that he is a normal
child in every way, and that any difficulty he has had
in school is not in any way connected with his home life.
He reads very satisfactory now for a begin~er. I and
Mrs. Stuber work with him in his school 'vork. His
teachers have ne·ver complained to us that his 'vork "\vas
not satisfactory ( T -57). There is a great deal of affection between myself and Bruce and I want it to continue
that way. We have never had any trouble with respondent about seeing Bruce, except on one occasion 'vhen we
both wanted him at Easter time when we 'vere going up
the canyon (T-58).
We have had no difficulties in the re·spondent's visits
with Bruce. We have had no animosity against her and
very often inconvenience ourselves to accommodate· her.
We want him to know his mother and have a nor1nal
relationship with her as far as possible (T-59). When
I had my conversation with respondent when sp.e wanted
me to take Bruce, there was nothing said about her taking him as a dependent. I did not know that ~he had been
taking him as a dependent until she called me the day
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

13
before Christmas of 1950. Following that tin1e, I received
a letter from her attorney. lT p to that time, she had
never asked for any alin1ony payments (T-60). I have
never slammed the door in the respondent's face when
she crune for Bruce. I do not know what she means about
somebody being nasty about it. I feel very sure that
Bruce will be better off remaining with me and my
present wife and mother, a least until the respondent
shows more stability in her mode of life (T-61). Except
for eolds, there 'vas only two oecasions when Bruce was
away from school. Once he was on the grounds and came
home instead of going to school, and on another occasion,
he was with me deer hunting for two days (T-63). At
the present time, I am working, my wife works, and my
Inother works, and we have a baby tender part of the
time (T-64). I have helped Bruce with his reading, and
he seems to be a fair dra,ver, and he likes to have us read
to him. I went to school with hi1n when he registered
(T-66). I talked to the teacher about the occasion he was
truant. It vvould be like losing my right arm to have
Bruce taken by respondent. He has never been a"\vay
from me from the time he was born (T-67). We have
thre·e ample bedrooms in our home and all toilet and
lavatory facilities (T-68).
1\frs. S.ylvia Stuber, appellant's wife, testified that
she and l\Ir. Stuber were married on October 15, 1947,
and that they live in the ho1ne of Mr. Stuber's mother.
They 1noved in 'vith Mr. Stuber's mother in July, 1948
(T-69-70). Bruce has been with us ever since and _was
with us before that part of the ti1ne and the rest of the
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time with Mr. Stuber's mother. We have one other child,
Stephen, who is two years of age, and he and Bruce have
sort of grown up together. They are very close to one
another and Bruce is very protective of Stephen. I think
a great deal of Bruce and I know he does of me (T-71).
I have taken care of him when he has been ill and watched
and worked ·for him as if he were my own. Since we have
lived with Mr. Stuber's mother, she has left his care
with me and has not interfered in any way. We all get
along very fine together (T-72). I work for the Greyhound Bus and make $90.00 each t'vo weeks before deductions. They take about $25.00 a month for incon1e tax,
$4.00 a month for hospitalization, $6.00 for union dues·
and $2.00 for insurance and Social Security. When I
have a baby tender, I pay her between $50.00 and $60.00
per month (T-73). The only reason I work is hecau:-;r
Mr. Stuber does not make sufficient to get ahead and -vve
have wante·d to get a h~·me in the country with a little
acreage. All of l\1:r. Stuber's earnings have been devoted
to the support of the two children and ourselves ( T -7 J).
When we have a baby tender, she comes before I leave
in the morning, and I am home at 4 :30. I am acquainted
with the respondent (T-75). She usually calls by telephone before she takes Bruce. She· stops and honks and
I usually have him ready to go with her. There have
been no unpleasant incidents between respondent and
mys.elf, and I try to accommodate myself to her convenience. I have never slammed the. door in her face.
Her mother has sometimes called for Bruce and ha.s kept
him a day or so, and we have never had any difficulty
about it (T-77). We have never had any conflict about
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visitation except one day 'vhen I had planned a birthday
party for hiin (T-78).
I have had Bruce to son1e of the best doctors in town
and they say his health is excellent. He has had a number
of colds (T-79). Some of my earnings I have paid for a
tonsil operation for Bruce and I have bought clothing
for him and Stephen and 1nade a down-payment on an
automobile (T-80). I also bought a refr~gerator. After
deductions from ~Ir. Stuber's pay check, it isn't more
than $350.00 a n1onth, and from that he has to pay out
about $80.00 to $90.00 a month for his road expenses. ·
Our grocery bill an1ounts to about $130.00 per month.
I love Bruce as much as I do my own child (T-81). l\fr.
Stuber's mother is home on Saturdays and Sundays, and
I am home mostly Thursdays and Fridays (T-82).
The court rendered its decision in this cause (T-8890), its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (T-9194), and its Judgment (T-95-96). By the judgment, the
court required that the appellant surrender the. child,
Bruce Stuber, to the respondent, and that defendant's
Petition for Modification of the Decree be denied; that
respondent have judgn1ent against the appellant for the
sum of $220.00 on account of respondent's income tax
deficiency and for any other deficiency that n1ight arise
by reason of the respondent clain1ing the child, Bruce
Stuber, as a dependent; that the appellant be released
and discharged from any other obligation to the respondent; that in all other respeets the Decree of Divorce
remain in force and effect, and that respondent be grantSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ed judgment against the appellant for $100.00 attorney's
fees.
A motion for the amendment of the Findings \Vas
made (T-98-100) and the same denied on October 6, 1951
(T-101). The Notice of Appeal was filed on October 9,
1951 (T-102), and an order extending time to file the
record on appeal to and including December 3, 1951, was
made on No:vember 19, 1951 (T-104). The Designation of
Record on Appeal wa.s filed October 18, 1951 (T-105-106).
STATEMENT OF· POINTS
POINT I.
THE CO,URT ERRED IN ENTERING ITS JUDGMENT
AWARDING THE CARE, CUSTODY, AND CONTROL OF
THE MINOR CHILD, BRUCE STUBER, TO THE RESPONDENT AND ERRED IN FAILING TO MODIFY THE DECREE
OF DIVORCE SO AS TO AWARD THE CARE, CUSTODY,
AND CONTROL OF THE MINOR CHILD TO THE APPELLANT, SUBJECT TO REASONABLE VISITATION BY THE
RESPONDENT.

POINT II.
THE COURT ERRED IN ENTERING ITS JUDGMENT
IN FAVOR OF THE RESPONDENT AND AGAINST THE
APPELLANT FOR THE SUl\f OF $220.00, BEING THE
AMOUNT FOR WHICH RESPONDENT WAS AT SAID TilVIE
INDEBTED TO THE COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE ARISING OUT OF THE FACT THAT RESPONDENT
FOR A PERIOD OF TWO YEARS CLAIMED THE MINOR
CHILD, BRUCE STUBER, AS A DEPENDENT IN HER
INCOME TAX RETURN AND ALSO ERRED IN REQUIRING
THE APPELLANT TO PAY ANY OTHER SUM OR SUMS
FOR WHICH THE RESPONDENT MIGHT BECOME OBLISponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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GATED TO PAY THE COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE BY REASON OF RESPONDENT CLAIMING SAID
CHILD AS A DEPENDENT.

POINT III.
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO ENTER JUDGl\IENT IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLANT AND AGAINST
THE RESPONDENT MODIFYING THE DECREE OF
DIVORCE SO AS TO RELIEVE THE APPELLANT FROM
THE PAYMENT OF FUTURE ALIMONY TO RESPONDENT.

POINT IV.
THE COURT ERRED IN AWARDING THE RESPONDENT ATTORNEY'S FEES IN THE SUM OF $100.00.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE COURT ERRED IN ENTERING ITS JUDGMENT
AWARDING THE CARE, CUSTODY, AND CONTROL OF
TI-IE lVIINOR CHILD, BRUCE STUBER, TO THE RESPONDENT A!{D ERR;ED I}~ FAILING TO MODIFY THE DECREE
OF DIVORCE SO i\S TO AWARD THE CARE, CUSTODY,
AND CONTROL OF THE MINOR CHILD TO THE APPELLANT, SUBJECT TO REASONABLE VISITATION BY THE
RESPONDENT.

The testimony in this cause established vvithout con-'
fiict that the minor child of plaintiff and defendant,
Bruce Stuber, has been in the care, custody, and control
of appellant, his father, from the ti1ne that said child
vvas 14 months of age. He is now seven years of age~
Plaintiff and defendant each testified that respondent
requested appellant to take over the custody of this
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child at which time it was agreed that if the appellant
would assume the obligation of the child's care and support, that respondent would make no claim against appellant for the alimony which had been awarded by the
D·ecree of Divorce, made and .entered on March 29, 1945.
The appellant, relying upon this agreement, has ever
since the month of February, 1946, sincerely devoted
himself to · the general welfare of this child, has given
it support and supplied its every need and by his own
efforts 'and the efforts of his mother and present wife
have given to said child all of the comforts of a ho1ne,
and bestowed upon him their love, care, and affection
and are now deeply attached to said child and ate greatly
.concerned about his future welfare. The respondent;
herself, was una,ble to disclose any \vant of care and
consideration for the child. In contrast to sueh loiVe and
devotion, the respondent for a period of t\vo years,
wholly failed to show any interest whatever in the \velfare of this child and even failed to see or visit it. The
attitude of the mother toward the child during thi:~
period is sought to be justified by the explanation that
she felt the child would be better off if she did not interfere with the custody of appellant or the appellant's
mother who took care of said child 'vhen the appellant
was at work. It se.ems reasonable to say that the period
of time when this child had the greatest need of its
mother has now pas~ed and the child having now attained
the age of 7 ye,ars, the respondent for the first time seeks
to recover its custody and control. It would also seern
to be a reasonable conclusion that she now seek custody
and contro1 for her own pleasure and ·benefit and not
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for the general welfare of said child. The evidence discloses "\Yithout anY
., substantial conflict that since the
Inother has taken sufficient interest in the child to see
and visit said child, that there has been the greatest
cooperation on the part of the father and his present
'vife to make that association pleasant and agreeable.
Since January, 1950, the mother has visited said child
on an average of ap·proxin1ately once a month. Since
the mother concluded to see and visit with the child, she
has been caused no difficulty nor inconvenience in so
doing, except on two occasions. On one of these. occasions, the appellant's wife had arranged a birthday
party for·the child and on the other occasion the app·ellant had arranged an Easter trip for the family. The
respondent's mother testified that she had never had
any trouble when she \Vent to get Bruce, and that appellant and his ·wife had al,vays been friendly to her. Any
slight disturbances v;hich might have occurred when the
respondent has taken the child are of immaterial consequence. It seems to appellant that the respondent
has "\vholly failed to show such interest in the child as
should per1nit her at this time to disturb the very satisfactory relationship \vhich has existed between the child
and those charged with its care and maintenance, and
has wholly failed to show that the \velfare of the child
will be best or better served by having its custody awarded to her. If "\Ve disregard entirely the lack of interest
shown in the child by the mother for two years of its
early life, it will still be reflected by the evidence that
the respondent's mode of life is not sufficiently stabilized
n.s to show any permanent ability on her part to give
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to the child the surroundings and care that it will require
in the future. Respondent testified that she has not
lived at her mother's home since she was married to
Mr. Stuber; that if she were to obtain the custody of
Bruce, she would have him live with her mother who
would care for him, and that Respondent does not intend
to live with her mother where said child would be unless
some arrangement could be rnade which was not apparent at the time of trial. In other words, it would seen1
that the proceedings brought by the respondent \Vere
primarily conducted for the purpose of securing the
custody and control of the child for the respondent's
mother. There is nothing to appear in the record from
which any reasonable inference can be made that the
relationship between mother and child, if a-\varded to
respondent, would be any different than the relationship
which has existed during the period of time that thr
respondent has taken sufficient interest in the child t? ·
see it on occasions. The further facts appear \vithout
dispute that the respondent expects some tin1e to marry.
This expectation, however, is based upon the present
association of the respondent with a married man, and
that respondent and s~id married man were registered
at 234 North Main Street, S.alt Lake City, Utah for a
period of app-roximately one year as Mr. and Mrs. }~red
Bacon. She has indicated by her testimony that she
expects ~o marry this man, but certainly the welfare of
this child should not be predicated up~n the possibility
that such a marriage may take place in the future, and
it would be of the opinion of the 'vriters of this brief,
. under all of the circumstances, that such a marriage is
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highly improbable and if it \Yere to take place, it is difficult to 8ee how the best intere8t of this child could be
served by taking it a\Yay fron1 its father, with whom
it has been living all these years, and to place it more
or less under the direction and control of some man
with whom said child has had no association and is probably \\~holly unacquainted.
As \Ye understood the law in this jurisdiction, it
has now been definitely decided that in dete-rmining
the right of custody of minor children that such determination will be made solely in the interest of the child.
Our statute, Section 40-3-10, provides that:
'~In

any case of sep·aration of husband and
wife having- minor childre-n, the n1other shall be
entitled to the care, control and custody of all
such children * * * provided further, that if it
shall be made to appear to a court of compet~nt
jurisdiction that the mother is an immoral, incompetent or otherwise improper person, then the
court may award the custody of the children to
the father or n1ake such other order as may be
just."
By some cases, this court had construed the above
statute so as to give a fit mother a.primary right to the
custody of 1ninor children. Subsequently in the case,
~llley v. Alley, 72 Utah 196, 269 Pac. 487, in a decision
\Vritten by the late· Justice Cherry it was held:
"So far as the superior right of the mother
under the statute is concerned, we think she has
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waived and lost it in consequence of her failure
to assert it on the two previous occasions mentioned. And there being no sufficient grounds
shown or claimed why the welfare of the child
demands a change of its custody, we find no merit
in the appeal."
More re-cently in the case of Sampsell v. Iiolt, ___ _

Utah ____ , 202 Pac. 2nd 550, this court construed the foreg-oing statute in the· following language:
"Moreover, it seems unreasonable to attribute
to the legislature a purpose or intent to give to a
divorced mother an absolute right to the control
and custody of a child under ten years of age,
without regard to the best interest of such child.
For many centuries, it has been the policy of the
law in matters of this sort to give controlling
weight to the considerations of the best interest
of the child. There is nothing in the· legislative
history of these se-ctions to indicate that it was
the intent of the legislature to alter this principle.
Sec. 40-3-10 must be understood a.s applying only
to cas·es of separation, and not to cases of divorce.
* * *
"Child custody proceedings are equitable in
the highest degree, and this court has consistently
held that the· best interest and welfare of the
minor child is the. controlling factor in every case.
Walton v. Coffman, 110 Utah 1, 169 P. 2d 97, and
cases there cited. Such proceedings being equitable, we may review the facts as well a.s the la'v
on appeal."
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\Ye assun1e therefore "~ithout thP eitation of further

authority that the sole question to be deter1nined under
Point I is \Yhether or not the eourt has Prred or has failed
to exercise a sound discretion in a\Yarding the custody
of the child, Bruce Stuber, to the Respondent in vie\v
of all of the facts and circumstances appearing in the
pleadings and the evidence.

POINT II.
THE COURT ERRED IN ENTERING ITS JUDGMENT
IN FAVOR OF THE RESPONDENT AND AGAINST THE
APPELLANT FOR THE SUlVI OF $220.00, BEING THE
AMOUNT FOR WHICI-I RESPONDENT WAS AT SAID TIME
INDEBTED TO THE COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE ARISING OUT OF THE FACT THAT RESPONDENT
FOR A PERIOD OF TWO YEARS CLAIMED THE MINOR
CHILD, BRUCE STUBER, AS A DEPENDENT IN HER
INCOME TAX RETURN AND ALSO ERRED IN REQUIRING
THE APPELLANT TO PAY ANY OTHER SUM OR SUMS
FOR V/HICH THE RESPONDENT MIGHT BECOME OBLIGATED TO PAY THE COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE BY REASON OF RESPONDENT CLAIMING SAID
CIIILD AS A DEPENDENT.

The respondent admits that she and the appellant
had an agreement concerning the care, custody, and control of the minor child. She testified that this agreement
'vas had about two months after the separation of herself
and Mr. Stuber; that at that time she knew that Bruce
would be taken care of by Mrs. Stuber's mother and supported by f.Ir. Stuber; that Mr. Stube-r did take good
care of him, and that she agreed that he. sh~uld take
Bruce and told Mr. Stuber that if Bruce were well taken
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care of there would not be any trouble (T-27). When
she and Mr. Stuber talked about Mr. Stuber taking
Bruce, she didn't say he would be released,. but talked
about her taking Bruce as a dependent; that at that time
she was employed at the Lerner Shops (T-33); that she
did not thereafter talk to Mr. Stuber about taking Bruce
as a dependent until she had notice from the Office of
the Collector of Internal Revenue; that she never at any
time requested Mr. Stuber to make payment of alimony
until the question arose about her taking Bruce as a
dependent ( T -35).
The record discloses that Mrs. Stuber was en1ployed
during all of the period from the time of the separation
of herself and Mr. Stuber. It is apparent that for the
first two years of her employment she either did not
take Bruce as a de:pendent or if she did, it did not corne
to the attention of the Collector of Internal Revenue.
At all events for the entire period of time since the
Decree of Divorce and until the Collector ascertained
that Mrs. Stuber was clailning the child as a de:pendent,
which would be a period of approxin1ately four years,
Mrs. Stuber made no claim against the appellant. It
seems obvious to the writers of this brief that if any
such agreement existed as testified to by Mrs. Stuber,
that she would at least have notified Mr. Stuber of the
time when she commenced taking Bruce as a dependent.
Mr. Stuber testified that when he took the custody of
Bruce," respondent was living with a girl friend; that
she was then having trouble with her mothe·r and did
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not 'Yant her 1nother to haYe the custody of Bruce~; that
he 'vas up to see the baby one day and it was ill and it
,,~as then agreed that he take the baby and that when he
did take it, he 'Yas not to pay respondent any 1nore support money or alimony. nlr. Stuber paid his mother
$60.00 a month for the care of Bruce and p·aid all of the
home bills and groceries (T-51-53). He did not know
that )lrs. Stuber "~as taking Bruce as a dependent until
just before Christmas of 1950; that when he had the
above conversation with respondent, there was nothing
said about her taking him as a dependent (T-59-60).
Considering all of the surrounding facts and circumstances, we think it- probable that the testimony of Mr.
Stuber in regard to the agreement when the custody of
Bruce was surrende-red to him that nothing would have
been said concerning who should take Bruce as a dependent. This would be especially true because the respondent was 'vell aware that the entire sup.port of Bruce
was being provided by the appellant, and that she
would have no legal right under such circumstances to
take credit for Bruce as such dependent. We submit
therefore that the court erred in· finding that such an
agree1nent was made and in rendering j·tidgment against
the appellant as set forth in Point II.
POINT III.
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO ENTER JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLANT AND AGAINST
THE RESPONDENT MODIFYING THE DECREE OF
DIVORCE SO AS TO RELIEVE THE APPELLANT FROM
TI-IE PAYMENT OF FUTURE ALIMONY TO RESPONDENT.
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Without further discussion of the above point, we
request the court's consideration there~of under the argument presented under Point IV and respectfully submit
that the appellant was entitled under the circumstances
to be relieved from the payment of alimony in the future
to the Respondent.

POIN'l, IV.
THE COURT ERRED IN AWARDING THE RESPONDENT ATTORNEY'S FEES IN THE SUM OF $100.00.

The appellant admits that if the respondent "\vas
entitle~d to an award of attorney's fees that the amount
required to be paid by the decre·e is not unreasonable,
but we are of the opinion that in this case the respondent
was not entitled to an award of attorney's fees. The
evidence disclO.ses, as hereinbefore po~inted out, that this
pr9~eeding was initiate·d by the respondent for the purpose of recovering the future care, custody, and control
of the minor child of the parties and for the purpose of
recovering a judgment for accrued alimony clain1ed in
the respondent's Affidavit in the amount of $3,550.00. In
the lower court the re~pondent prevailed as to the custody
of the minor child, but recoiVered nothing unde·r her clain1
that there was due and owing $3,550.00 in unpaid alimony.
On the respondent's claim for unpaid alin1ony, the
court found in Paragraph No. 6 of the Findings (T-9:393) that because of the agreement entered into by plaintiff and defendant plaintiff was entitled to recover frorn
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the defendant the sun1 or sun1s of n1oney she "'ill be obligated to pay to the Collector of Internal Revenue by
reason of said Collector disallowing the· plaintiff the
right to take said minor child as a dependent. The court
further found that because of said agreement the plaintiff had \vaived her right to receive fron1 the defendant
any amount of alimony pa~""Inents in arrears in excess of
the amount or amounts she will be compelled to pay the
Collector of Internal Revenue. It will thus be seen that
the plaintiff did not prevail on her claim for unpaid
alimony. lTnder these circumstances it would appear
that each party should be required to bear his own
attorney's fees.
Furthermore, there is no evidence which discloses
that the respondent was unable to pay her own attorney's
fees. The record discloses that the respondent was regularly employed. So far as disclosed by the record, it
may be a fact that the respondent had ample funds or
property on hand without re·gard to her earnings to meet
her own attorney's fees and court costs and the record
affirmatively shows that at the time her proceedings
were commenced, she was regularly employed by the
Blue Cross Insurance Company and earned $130.00
per month after her deductions; that she had been working at different jobs for the last four or five yea.rs (T-41).
The record also discloses that the respondent is more
able or equally as able as appellant to bear her own
expenses. Mr .. Stuber earns after deductions between
$325.00 and $350.00 a month ( T -49). Mrs. Stuber testi:.
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fied that the pay check of Mr. Stuber is not more than
$350.00 a month and from that amount, he pays from
$80.00 to $90.00 a ntonth while he is away on his runs as
a brakeman for the Union Pacific Railroad. The grocery
bill each month for the support of the family, including
app~llant's mother in whose· home appellant and his
family live, amounts to $130.00 per month. The appellant
also pays for all of the utilities used in the hoine. He
is compelled to pay for his hotel room and meals on
each trip out. In consideration of living with his mother
in her home, he buys all of the groceries for the family
including his mother (T-65, 81-82). The record does not·
show the amount expended for utilities such as telephone,
electricity, and gas, but would at least reduce the net
income ·of $130.00 per month to approximately $110.00 a
month, and if it were not for the inco~me of his wife,
he would have to p·ay the installments on the purchase of
his automobile, togethe-r with medical expenses from tin1e
to time as they arise.
The app·ellant's wife testified that she works for tl1e
Greyhound Bus Company and earns $90.00 each two
weeks before deductions; that she has the following
deductions: $25.00 per month for incon1e tax, $4.00 per
month for hospitalization, $6.00 per month for union
dues, $2.00 for insurance and social security; she further
testified that at the· tin1e of trial, she was paying the
sum of $50.00 to $60.00 per month for a baby tender frorn
the wages she was re-ceiving because appellant's 1nother
was working; and that the only reason she works is because Mr. Stuber did not make sufficient to get ahead
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and they "1"anted to buy a home ( T-73-75). She had also
paid ~rom her o'vn earnings for a tonsil operation for
Bruce; had bought hin1 clothing; and n1ade a down-payment on an auton1obile and bought a refrigerator (T-7980). Appellant and his 'vife had contracted obligations
and laid out plans for the future welfare of themselves
and their family without any anticipation whatsoever
that they would be called upon to meet the expense which
would arise incident to this litigation. So that at the
time the same was commenced and at the time of trial,
their obligations and the necessities of their family were
such that it would seem that the respondent was much
more able to bear her own expenses than the appellant.
Furthermore, we submit it is not unreasonable to assume
that the respondent gets financial assistance from the
person with whom she has been associating and apparently living with for a considerable period of time.

In the Affidavit which was filed initiating these proceedings (T-3), no claim was made that respondent was
unable to meet her own expenses and attorney's fees.
Under all of the circumstances, we respectfully submit
that this is not a case wherein attorney's fees should
be awarded. In the. case of Weiss vs. Weiss, 111 Utah
353, 179 Pac. 2nd 1005, this court held:

"That it is proper for the court to allow attorney's fees in its discretion provided the necessity
for such awards is found to exist."
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CONCLUSION
We respectfully submit that the appellant is entitled
to the relief denied him in respect to the points herein- ,
before discussed.
Respectfully submitted,

A. H.HOUGAARD
JOE P. BOSONE
Atto'f"neys for Appellant
405 Felt Building

Salt Lake City, Utah
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